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WHEN CRIMINAL AND TORT LAW INCENTIVES RUN
 
INTO TIGHT BUDGETS AND REGULATORY DISCRETION
 
WILLIAM G. CHILDS* 
Eight-year-old Greyson Yoe was electrocuted while waiting to get on 
the "Scooters" bumper car ride at the Lake County Fair in northeastern 
Ohio. The failure to ground the ride structure and damage to a light fixture 
on the ride caused his death. The day before the electrocution, two 
inspectors from the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) inspected the 
ride and passed it as "safe to operate." That inspection was superficial and 
grossly inadequate, and the completed inspection form had serious 
misrepresentations. Indeed, the inspectors later admitted that they never 
reviewed the key electrical items that they checked off on the inspection 
form. The post-electrocution review not only showed that the electrical 
system had gross safety problems but also that the ride's management and 
operators knew of and ignored these problems. 
This Article is not about the electrocution; it is not about the botched 
inspection; nor is it about the ignored problems. The lay press covered 
those well. Instead, this Article is about the response of the responsible 
authority, the ODA, to the civil and criminal actions brought or promised 
against it and its employees. The ODA appears to have chosen to protect 
itself and its employees by getting out of the business of protecting the 
public from similar electrical hazards. Such actions, under a prominent 
theory regarding the foundations of tort and criminal law, are predictable 
and unsurprising. Further, the ODA's acts should call into question certain 
assumptions about the incentives created by criminal and tort law. 
Traditional tort and criminal law jurisprudence assume that the 
potential for, and reality of, civil or criminal liability changes behavior.' In 
Copyright © 2006 William G. Childs. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Thanks 
to David Owen of the University of South Carolina School of Law, David Robertson of the 
University of Texas School of Law, Mary Jane Morrison of the Han-line University School 
of Law, and Adam Feibelman of the University of North Carolina School of Law for their 
comments during the development of this Article. Thanks also to participants in a faculty 
symposium at Western New England College School of Law. I also appreciate the 
technical assistance of members of the "Amusement-Safety" listserv and W. Ves Childs, 
Ph.D. Thanks to the Ohio Department of Agriculture for prompt and courteous responses 
to my requests under Ohio's open records law, to the Lake County Clerk's staff for its 
assistance, and to Judge Eugene A. Lucci for providing the trial transcript of State v. Rock. 
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particular, many scholars contend that liability makes the injuries or harms 
caused by a violation of tort or criminal law standards less likely to occur 
in the future by way of what is sometimes called "specific deterrence" in 
the case
2 
of the individual defendant or "general deterrence" in the case of 
others. 
This Article explores one instance of what may be a broader problem 
for such deterrence theory: a defendant who controls the standards by 
which it is judged, in an age of tight budgets and financial pressures, where 
government is expected to operate "like a business." In that scenario, 
incentives can combine to make the situation post-litigation more 
dangerous rather than less dangerous. 
This Article has four parts. First, I describe the particular factual 
scenario involving the electrocution of Greyson Yoe. I briefly explore the 
actions and omissions that led to his electrocution, and then turn to the 
criminal and civil litigation that followed. I also describe in detail the 
response of regulators to that litigation-a response that surprised many 
observers. In the second part, I discuss what response would ordinarily be 
expected from that sort of criminal and civil litigation. In the third part, I 
compare the expected response to what ensued and explore three 
interrelated reasons why the regulators may have reacted the way that they 
did, and why such a reaction, in retrospect, is unsurprising. In the final 
part, I discuss how those reasons might affect similar situations in the 
future and I offer some potential solutions. I also discuss why this 
problemr--involving public actors-is particularly troubling as compared 
to some otherwise similar situations involving private actors. 
Margaret R. Solis provided excellent research assistance, and the editors of the Capital 
University Law Review provided valuable comments and editorial assistance. Finally, as 
always, thanks to Dena, Ella, and Liam Childs. Errors are, of course, my own. Many of the 
key documents referenced in this Article are available at my website, http://masstort.org, 
and any that are not posted there are available upon request. 
1 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulationof CriminalLaw Rules: At Its Worst when Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 
956-69 (2003); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The HistoricalContinuity of Punitive 
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1269, 1318-20 
(1993). 
2E.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition ofDeterrence, 113 HARv. L. REv. 413, 425 
(1999); Rustad & Koenig, supranote 1, at 1319. 
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I. THE ELECTROCUTION OF GREYSON YOE, THE LITIGATION THAT
 
FOLLOWED, AND THE RESPONSE
 
On August 13, 2003, eight-year-old Greyson Yoe, a healthy young 
boy, went with his father to the Lake County Fair in northeastern Ohio. 
He asked to ride the bumper cars, known as the "Scooters." 4 While 
standing in line, watching other riders, he leaned on the ride's metal railing 
and suffered a severe electrical shock.5 His feet were on the ground and 
his body acted as a path for the electrical current to the ground. He cried 
out, "Help me," and collapsed.6 He was immediately given CPR7 but died 
after several weeks in intensive care.8 
Yoe' s death, which resulted directly from a combination of a failure to 
ground the ride's structure 9 and an electrical fault caused by a damaged 
light fixture,'0 should not have surprised any of a number of people: 
3Statement of Audra J.Yoe to Lake County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 15, 2003) (on file 
with author); Statement of William S. Yoe Jr. to Lake County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 16, 
2003) (on file with author). 
4See William S. Yoe Jr., supranote 3. 
5Maggi Martin, Electrocuted Boy's Family Settles, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 25, 
2005, at B2; Statement of Elizabeth M. Kaplowitz to Lake County Sheriffs Dep't (Aug. 19, 
2003) (on file with author). 
6Kaplowitz, supra note 5. 
7Audra J. Yoe, supra note 3. 
8 See State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 000025, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County 
June 28, 2004) (on file with author). 
9Contemporary 120-volt electrical equipment has three wires: black (high voltage), 
white (neutral), and green (ground). See THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HOME WIRING: A 
COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL, FROM BASIC REPAIRS TO ADVANCED PROJECrS 14 (Cowles 
Creative Publ'g ed., 1998) [hereinafter GUIDE TO HOME WIRING]. (240-volt devices have 
four wires, but the extra one is unimportant in this discussion.) The white and green wires 
are solidly grounded at the transformer. See id. at 16. The green wire is also connected to 
exposed metal in the system (including, for example, the metal railing around the Scooters 
ride). See id. at 16 fig. Electrical current is supposed to run through the black wire, 
through the load (e.g., the transformer used to power the bumper cars with DC power), and 
then through the white wire. Id. When there is an insulation failure, current can create 
dangerous voltage on exposed metal. See id. at 16; BOB DRIES,MANUAL OF ELECTRICAL 
CONTRACTING 16 (1983). If the metal is properly grounded through the green wire, the 
ground fault current will be shunted back to the solid ground, but only if the green wire is 
attached to the solid ground, whether a rod driven into the ground, the electric company's 
earth ground, or otherwise. See GUIDE TO HOME WIRING, supra, at 16. 
Grounding will not protect a person who touches a live wire, though a ground fault 
circuit interrupter unit (required in new kitchen, bath, garage, and exterior construction) 
(continued) 
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" 	 The fair board did not obtain an electrical permit for 
connecting the ride to a utility pole; had such a permit 
been obtained, a licensed electrician would have 
inspected the hook-up and likely observed and 
corrected the lack of grounding and other electrical 
problems. " 
" 	 The electrician who connected the ride (an eighty­
year-old former lineman for an Ohio electrical 
company)' 2 left the ride's grounding wire dangling at 
the pole, unattached.' 3 He made no effort to confirm 
that the ride was otherwise grounded, stating that he 
assumed it had a grounding rod elsewhere.' 
4 
" 	 The ride owner knew about the damaged light fixture 5 
but made no effort to repair it and failed to inform ride 
inspectors of the loose wire in the fixture.' 
6 
may do so. Do It Yourself.Com, The GFCI, http://doityourself.com/electric/gfci.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2006); see generally Mike Holt,Grounding v. Bonding Part 1 of 12 (Jan. 
12, 2005), http://ecmweb.com/mag/electricgrounding, vs-bonding (providing information 
about proper grounding safety). Grounding will, however, often prevent injuries of the sort 
that resulted in Greyson Yoe's death, and it is apparently undisputed that proper grounding 
would have prevented his death. See State v. Rock, Lake App. No. 2004-L-127, 2005­
Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, 20. 
1oRock, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, IN 14, 16,20. 
1 Letter from Leonard Cavalier, former Chief Inspector, Div. of Amusement Ride 
Safety, Ohio Dep't of Agric., to Donald S. Varian, Jr., Attorney at Law (Oct. 6, 2004) (on 
file with author). Mr. Cavalier was hired by one ride inspector's attorney to evaluate the 
work performed by the inspectors, and his report was presented as part of the inspector's 
sentencing memorandum. Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, State v. Turner, No. 04 
CR 000025 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County Jan. 18, 2005) (on file with author). 
12 Maggi Martin, FairWorker Didn'tFollow Wiring Rules, Expert Says, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), June 4, 2004, at B3. 
13See Rock, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, 10. 
14Transcript of Proceedings Volume I of VI at 1023, State v. Rock, No. 04 CR 000027 
(Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County June 15, 2004) (on file with author). Rock testified that he 
"folded" the green wire around so that it would not short, id. at 993, that he did not confirm 
grounding, and that he "assumed that it was grounded." Id. at 1023. 
15 Letter from William A. Hopper, Jr., Chief Legal Counsel, Ohio Dep't of Agric., to 
author attachment 35 (Feb. 8, 2005) (on file with author) (photographs of loose wire). 
16Cavalier, supranote 11 (stating that the ride owner failed to disclose the loose wire to 
the inspectors); Letter from Ralph Dolence, Dolence Elec. Technical Consultants, Inc., to 
Ron Walters, Lieutenant, Lake County Sheriffs Dep't (Aug. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.masstort.org/Downloads/ODAIODAl14-119.pdf ("The ride owner stated that 
(continued) 
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" 	 Ride operators and their supervisors ignored or 
belittled the complaints of patrons who reported 
feeling shocks both earlier during the 2003 fair and the 
17 
year prior. 
* 	 Ride operators and their supervisors also apparently 
disregarded the ride's electrical system's regular 
failures throughout the 2003 fair. Instead, among 
other things, fuses were bypassed with aluminum foil, 
and ride operators would simply reset circuit breakers 
and continue operation. 18 
during the setup of the ride the lighting cord got caught in the mechanism and was torn out 
of the weather tite work box and was never repaired."). 
17See, e.g., Statement of Michelle M. Bicker to Lake County Sheriff s Dep't (n.d.) (on 
file with author) (stating that she was shocked when touching the Scooter railing and that 
when she told a ride operator he responded that "there's nothing wrong [and] theres [sic] 
not [enough] voltage there to hurt anyone anyway"); Statement of Richard Doles to Lake 
County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 14, 2003) (on file with author) (reporting on a similar incident 
at the 2002 Lake County Fair, in which his eight-year-old son described being shocked for a 
few seconds). 
The electrician, Nicholas Rock, said that he had been connecting the rides at the fair for 
over forty years, Statement of Nicholas J. Rock, Lake County Fair Bd. Dir., to Lake County 
Sheriffs Dep't (Aug. 14, 2003), availableat http://www.masstort.org/ODA/ODA333.pdf, 
and so it seems likely that he did not ground the ride in 2002 either. 
The same company, Amusements of Buffalo, that provided the Scooters ride for the 
2003 Lake County Fair, Rock, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668, 5, also 
provided the ride in 2002. See Amusements of Buffalo, Inc., Ride Maintenance Log (2002) 
(on file with author). It appears, however, that the serial numbers of the bumper car rides 
differed each of those two years. The ODA inspectors checked "Equipment properly 
grounded" as "satisfactory" in 2002, just as they had in 2003. See Theodore Brubaker & 
Kalin N. Turner, Amusement Ride Safety Division, Ohio Department of Agriculture, Ride 
Inspection Form (Aug. 12, 2003), available at http://www.masstort.org/Downloads/ODA/ 
ODA362.pdf; Unknown Inspector, Amusement Ride Safety Division, Ohio Department of 
Agriculture, Ride Inspector Form (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with author) (inspector's name 
illegible). 
18See Hopper, Jr., supra note 15, attachment 3 (showing photographs of the control 
panels taken shortly after the accident where fuses were bypassed by wrapping with 
aluminum foil); Statement of David A. Storms to Lake County Sheriff's Dep't (Aug. 19, 
2003) (on file with author) (describing witnessing the ride operator resetting circuit 
breakers and reporting his statement that the ride "had been popping the breakers all 
afternoon but they couldn't find a problem"). 
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In sum, the ride was in a shambles, with problems far beyond the specific 
electrical issues that led to the electrocution. 19 
Most interesting, the ride had been inspected the day prior to the 
accident.20 The inspectors, who were ODA employees, specifically 
indicated on the inspection form (reproduced in part below) that the 
electrical system, including grounding, was "satisfactory"; in fact, the ride 
structure was not grounded, and the inspectors had made no effort to 
evaluate its
2
grounding, nor, it appears, any aspect of the electrical 
equipment: 1 
Mr. C OtteW~e fAvabo 
V-1cV00me;: Ph* a b* ~ r ,. 
As suggested above, there is plenty of blame to go around in 
connection with the death of Greyson Yoe, and much has already been 
allocated. The electrician and the ride owner were prosecuted criminally 2 
The electrician was found guilty of reckless homicide and involuntary 
manslaughter in a jury trial 23 and the ride owner pled guilty to attempted 
19 See Dolence, supranote 16. 
20 See Brubaker & Turner, supranote 17; see also State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 000025, 
slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. Lake County June 28, 2004) (on file with author). 
21 Brubaker & Turner, supranote 17; see Cavalier, supranote 11. The inspectors have 
argued that the form was deficient because it required essentially a "yes" or "no" answer in 
connection with checking grounding, and that they were unqualified to evaluate electrical 
matters. See Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 11. On the very form in 
question, however, the inspectors wrote "did not observe" on other subjects. Brubaker & 
Turner, supranote 17. Additionally, to be clear, there is no indication that the inspectors in 
fact saw anything that suggested the ride was grounded. To the contrary, there was no 
grounding rod or any other evidence of grounding. Dolence, supra note 16. Further, the 
inspectors did not even ask to confirm with the person who made the connection to the 
utility pole that the green grounding wire was attached to the power company's ground. 
See Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, supranote 11. 
22 Maggi Martin, ElectricianGets Jail in Death of Boy, 8, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), 
July 8, 2004, at BI. 
23 State v. Rock, Lake App. No. 2005-L-005, 2005-Ohio-6291, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5632, V 2, 6; Martin, supranote 22. The electrician was sentenced to thirty days in jail; his 
(continued) 
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involuntary manslaughter.24 The inspectors, too, were prosecuted, and 
ultimately pled no contest to a lesser charge of dereliction of duty, having 
been charged with various forms of homicide.25 
Civilly, Greyson's parents sued the county fair's board and the owner 
of the ride (which together settled for a total of nearly $2 million), and 
have publicly said that they will pursue suits against the state and the 
inspectors.26 As of this writing, those civil suits have not been filed. 
That leaves, of course, the ODA itself. In a move that surprised many 
and attracted the attention of editorial writers, after the prosecutions were 
completed, the ODA removed the grounding section from the inspection 
form entirely. 27 At the same time, the ODA added a notice to ride owners 
reminding them that the ride owner is responsible for abiding by all 
relevant codes, standards, and rules, including those relating to electrical 
grounding.28 
With ODA's decision to remove the grounding section from the form, 
Ohio ride inspectors will continue to inspect the rides, but will have no 
obligation to determine whether the rides are grounded. 29 That obligation 
involuntary manslaughter conviction was reversed but the sentence stood on the remaining 
conviction. Rock, 2005-Ohio-6291, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5632, 1 6; State v. Rock, Lake 
App. No. 2004-L-127, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5668; Martin, supra note 
22. 
24 Maggi Martin, Ride OwnerGets Jailfor FairDeath, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 
13, 2004, at B3. The ride owner was sentenced to six months in jail. Id. 
25 See Written Plea of No Contest and Judgment Entry, State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 
000025 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Lake County Nov. 4, 2004) (on file with author); Written Plea 
of No Contest and Judgment Entry, State v. Brubaker, No. 04 CR 000026 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
P1. Lake County Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with author). Both inspectors were sentenced to 
fifteen days in jail. Last Defendant Sentenced,PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 11, 2005, at 
B3. 26 Martin, supranote 5. 
27 Maggi Martin, Ohio Won't Test Rides for Proper Grounding, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Jan. 20, 2005, at BI; see, e.g., Lindsey Dodson, Amusement Ride Safety 
Division, Ohio Department of Agriculture, Ride Inspection Form (Aug. 17, 2004), 
available at http://www.masstort.org/Downloads/ODA/ODA355-360.pdf; see also 
Editorial, A FairChance at Safety, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 25, 2005, at B8.
2 8 See Dodson, supranote 27.
 
29 The ODA has stated that "electrical inspections were not changed or weakened after
 
Greyson's death" and that the "forms were edited because they were 'vague and open to 
misinterpretation."' Maggi Martin, Protecting Kids in Greyson's Name, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2005, at B I (quoting Mark Anthony, spokesman for the Ohio 
Department of Agriculture). While there is likely no perfect test for grounding, at least 
(continued) 
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is left in the hands of the ride owners, most of whom are presumably 
conscientious, but some of whom may be like the ride owner here, who 
readily admitted that he ignored a damaged light fixture, which resulted in 
a live wire contacting the ride's metal frame.31 
II. WHAT RESPONSE SHOULD WE HAVE EXPECTED? 
Traditional notions of tort and criminal law suggest that the criminal 
prosecutions and civil suits in this case should have had a different result-
tighter rather than looser regulations, or at least better enforcement of the 
regulations that existed. An intuitive response to punishment for particular 
conduct-or, in the civil tort context, to the requirements to reimburse 
another party for damages caused-is to help ensure that such conduct 
does not occur in the future, either by others ("general deterrence") or by 
this particular wrongdoer or tortfeasor ("specific deterrence").32 In the 
context of the Yoe case, we would expect the ODA to take action to ensure 
that its inspectors did in fact check rides' grounding and that its inspectors 
had the appropriate training and equipment to do so. 
some experts state that checking grounding is quite feasible for state inspectors and that 
such efforts would be relatively inexpensive. See Martin, supranote 27. Further, it seems 
evident that even an untrained inspector could at least determine if a grounding rod was 
present and, if not, inquire about whether the ground wire was attached at the pole. While 
such an approach would not necessarily catch all flawed grounding attempts, it would catch 
those situations in which no attempt at grounding at all occurred-the situation that killed 
Greyson Yoe. 
30 See State v. Rock, Lake App. No. 2004-L-127, 2005-Ohio-6285, 2005 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5668, 1 63. 
31 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Cleveland's The Plain Dealer 
characterized the ODA's move as "akin to giving the fox the hen house key and a permit to 
sell chicken suppers." A FairChance at Safety, supra note 27. Economically rational ride 
owners would be expected to do the necessary tests, but the existence of a regulatory and 
inspection system in the first place suggests that perhaps the owners do not act as 
conscientiously as Ohio's legislature would like. The Ohio legislature recently passed 
legislation (called Greyson's Law) that requires rides attached to a utility line to be certified 
compliant with the National Electrical Code. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.531(A)-(B) 
(West 2006); John Arthur Hutchison, Greyson's Law Now in Effect, NEWS-HERALD 
(Cleveland), July 1, 2005, available at http://www.news-herald.com (follow "Advanced 
Search" hyperlink, enter "Greyson's Law" in "Headline" field and "2005" in "Article from" 
field, and search). As discussed infra, a legislative fix is one approach to such a situation, 
but one unlikely to occur in the absence of the extensive publicity involved here. 
32 See sources cited supra notes 1-2. 
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General deterrence underlies a dominant view of the purposes of tort 
law, based on and growing out of the extensive "law-and-economics" 
scholarship.33 While certainly not the exclusive rationale, an important 
assumption of many participants in and observers of tort law is the 
fundamentally economic idea that potential liability affects conduct, 
specifically because individuals will avoid economically inefficient 
conduct.34 In short, we avoid conduct that will cost us money. Although 
such incentives are typically classified as "general deterrence," surely the 
specific deterrence constitutes a subset of the general-especially for 
repeat players. A car manufacturer who is found liable in tort for 
compensatory damages for a specific design decision will (at least in 
theory) have its future decisions affected. 
Beyond compensatory damages, punitive damages are frequently 
considered to have a specific deterrence component.35 Thus, punitive 
damages are appropriate because, in large part, they will deter not just 
others from acting badly, but also the particulardefendant from acting 
badly again.36 
As an additional incentive to "fix" tortious conduct, evidentiary rules
37 
typically exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures. 
33 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrenceand 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1801, 1828-33 (1997). One can think of deterrence 
theory (in both the criminal and tort law contexts) as secondary to an incapacitation 
theory-once the expenses of compliance with either criminal or tort standards make the 
conduct unprofitable, actors either choose to stop or are forced to stop via tort judgments or 
criminal liability. For the most part, my analysis herein tracks under either theory. 
34 See id. at 1831. A common explication of the standard of care in negligence law is 
the classic Learned Hand formula. E.g., David G. Owen, Towarda ProperTestfor Design 
Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing"Costs andBenefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1680 (1997). 
While that formula is intended to reflect overall costs and benefits, it is frequently observed 
that individual actors will make decisions based on their individual costs and benefits. See 
id. at 1680 n.61. In other words, they will ignore societal costs that they are unlikely to 
bear. It is the individual economically rational approach on which I focus. 
35 E.g., Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989) (describing punitive 
damages as "deter[ring] the wrongdoer and others from committing similar wrongs in the 
future"); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998) (exploring the economic implications of punitive 
damages); see also Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1831-32 (arguing that deterrence's 
economic components also contain a substantial "justice" component, but that such 
components are not incompatible). 
36 Green Oil Co., 539 So. 2d at 222. 
37 E.g., FED. R. EviD. 407. 
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Consequently, when a party merely stands accused of acting negligently, it 
can immediately take steps to avoid a recurrence of the harm without fear 
of that action being held up as evidence of past negligence. In the classic 
situation, if a storekeeper is sued in a slip-and-fall case, the storekeeper can 
install non-slip material in the area in question without being found to have 
implicitly admitted to negligence in failing to have it there before. The law 
seeks to create incentives to prevent individual actors from acting 
negligently in the same way again. 
As for the effect of criminal prosecution, both specific and general 
deterrence components of criminal liability are well-accepted, both by 
courts and commentators. Criminal punishment (in particular 
imprisonment) serves "retributive, educational, deterrent, and 
incapacitative goals. 3 
Specific deterrent effects are considered particularly effective and 
pronounced in institutional settings. In discussing prosecutions of 
corporations, for example, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson 
wrote: 
Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the 
government to address and be a force for positive change 
of corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, 
discover, and punish . . crime. . . . [A] corporate 
indictment may result in specific deterrence by changing 
the culture of the indicted corporation and the behavior of 
its employees.39 
Specific deterrence in prosecuting corporations would presumably 
apply equally in the context of prosecuting members of a governmental 
38 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000)); accord Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, 
Integrating Remorse and Apology into CriminalProcedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 89 (2004) 
("Traditionally, criminal law has focused on deterring, incapacitating, rehabilitating, and 
inflicting retribution on individual defendants."). Professors Bibas and Bierschbach also 
describe a classic approach to deterrence as suggesting that "[t]o the extent that the 
expected penalty for committing a crime outweighs the expected benefit, a potential 
wrongdoer will be deterred." Bibas & Bierschbach, supra,at 105-06. 
39 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to the Heads of Dep't Components (Jan. 20, 2003), availableat http://www.usdoj. 
gov/daglcftf/corporate-guidelines.htm. 
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regulatory agency, other things being comparable.40 When discussing an 
agency with fewer than ten inspectors, the criminal prosecution of one of 
the inspectors could be assumed to result in changes in behavior to avoid 
the problem reoccurring. So, one would expect the criminal prosecution of 
ODA employees to result in other employees (including higher-up 
regulators) acting with additional care in connection with (at least) 
electrical matters-whether through more cautious inspections or through 
more thorough training. 
Thus, both criminal and tort law are generally accepted as having a 
role in changing the specific conduct of the individuals whom or entities 
that are sued or prosecuted. In this case, the prosecution of ODA 
employees and the expected suits against the employees and the ODA 
itself would, one could reasonably expect, result in the enhancement of the 
inspection process as it relates to electrical matters. That expectation, 
however, was not realized here, for at least three reasons. 
111. WHY WAS THE ODA's RESPONSE DIFFERENT? 
The traditional notions of incentives in this case did not result in the 
behavior that one would ordinarily expect. The contrary response-
loosening regulations rather than tightening them--occurred, I submit, for 
at least three reasons. 
First, the ODA, like many regulatory agencies, creates its own 
guidelines.4' The legislature gave the ODA general direction to inspect 
amusement rides in the state of Ohio, but left discretion with the ODA to 
determine what those inspections will include. 42 Thus, the ODA has the 
ability to modify what its inspectors are required to do-to modify the 
definition of what is needed for "safe operation" of amusement rides. 
Shifting the responsibility for grounding to the ride owners is presumably 
40 Of course, all other things are not typically equal-in particular, governmental 
agencies frequently enjoy immunity from civil suits. Sovereign immunity is discussed 
infra. 
41 Cf.JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFETY 10-11 
(1990) (discussing the evolution of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's 
(NHTSA) approach to automobile regulation and noting the lack of specific direction 
provided by Congress and the ultimate focus on recalls rather than prospective regulation). 
42 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.53(B) (West Supp. 2005) (directing the director of 
agriculture to adopt rules "for the safe operation and inspection of all amusement rides" that 
are "reasonable and based upon generally accepted engineering standards and practices"). 
Of note, the statute authorizes, but does not require, the adoption of rules by reference to, 
among other things, the national electrical code. Id 
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within the scope, even if perhaps not within the spirit, of the legislative 
allocation of responsibility.43 
This discretion to define the standard of conduct is important for a 
variety of reasons. Most notably, it matters because the inspectors pled 
guilty to a misdemeanor entitled "dereliction of duty," 44 and the various 
homicide charges that they initially faced all relied upon that underlying 
charge.45  That misdemeanor makes criminal only that conduct that is 
contrary to "a duty expressly imposed by law."46 Because the ODA can 
change what duties are expressly imposed by law, by changing its 
regulations, it can also prospectively modify what conduct by its inspectors 
will be criminal under the dereliction of duty statute. In other words, the 
43 But see supranote 42. 
44 § 2921.44(E) ("No public servant shall recklessly fail to perform a duty expressly 
imposed by law with respect to [his] office, or recklessly do any act expressly forbidden by 
law with respect to [his] office."). This provision was added to Ohio law in 1974. 
§ 2921.44. Previously, state officials could be prosecuted for dereliction of duty based on 
misappropriation of funds, but only county and local government officials faced a general 
prohibition against recklessly failing to act as required by statute. Outo REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2921.44 note (West 1997) (Commentary). The Ohio courts have strictly applied the 
requirement that a dereliction of duty charge be based on an express duty set out in the 
statutory or administrative law. See State v. Gaul, 691 N.E.2d 760, 768, 771 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997) (reversing a conviction for dereliction of duty because the fiduciary duty owed by a 
state treasurer to the state was only implied in the statutory grant of authority). 
Additionally, the courts have ruled that a general description of a duty cannot be the basis 
of a criminal prosecution for dereliction of duty. See State v. Livesay, 698 N.E.2d 522, 524 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1998) (reversing the dereliction of duty conviction of a state vehicle 
inspector who did not adequately inspect vehicles because the applicable administrative 
regulations were "not so specific as to create criminal liability for failure to perform in 
accord with [them]"). A survey of instances when a party was convicted under section 
2921.44 found a small but varied group of cases. No single type of offense dominated, and 
the cases ranged from failure of a police officer to stop a crime in which the officer was 
involved to the failure of municipal officials to get competitive bids. See, e.g., State v. 
Freeman, 485 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio 1985) (upholding conviction of defendant for failing to 
obtain competitive bids); City of Cleveland v. Fischbach, Cuyahoga App. No. 84944, 2005­
Ohio-3164, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2946 (reversing conviction of officer who failed to stop 
a fight in which he was involved); State v. Johnson, Nos. C-990482 C-990483, 2000 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5321 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2000) (affirming conviction of officer for 
failing to stop herself from misusing coupons). 
45 See Indictment-Four Counts, State v. Turner, No. 04 CR 000025 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
Lake County Nov. 4, 2004); Indictment-Four Counts, State v. Brubaker, No. 04 CR 000026 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Lake County Oct. 15, 2004). 
46 § 2921.44(E). 
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ODA's modification of the form also modified at least one standard of 
criminal liability for its inspectors-the standard on which the inspectors' 
prosecutions in this case all were based. 
By changing that standard, the ODA also changed the availability of 
the doctrine of negligence per se in a civil suit against it or its employees.47 
If the inspector has not violated a duty imposed by law, he or she has not 
acted criminally (at least under the statute used in this case). If the 
inspector has not acted criminally, a civil suit cannot rely on that statutory 
violation to prove negligence per se. In the context of this case, if an 
inspector in the future ignores grounding problems with a ride, a plaintiff 
may still be able to prove negligence (and a prosecutor may be able to 
prove dereliction of duty), but it will be a harder case to make, especially 
given the explicit and publicly announced decision by the ODA that its 
inspectors have no responsibilities concerning grounding. 8 
Second, the ODA exists in a state government with budgetary 
challenges 49 and is presumably aware of the potential for substantial civil 
liability for such conduct.50 While liability might occur for conduct such 
47 See Gressman v. McClain, 533 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ohio 1988) ("It is well-settled that 
where a legislative enactment imposes a specific duty for the protection of others, a 
person's failure to observe that duty constitutes negligence per se."). Sovereign immunity, 
of course, affects the potential for civil liability; under Ohio law, state officers are immune 
unless the "officer's or employee's actions were manifestly outside the scope of his 
employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with 
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." OHio REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.86 (West 2001). Given the evidence, and given the guilty pleas and convictions, the 
individual actors here would potentially face individual exposure for which the state would 
presumably face vicarious liability. 
48 See supratext accompanying notes 27-28. 
49 See Margo Rutledge Kissell, The Fightfor Funds, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Sept. 7, 
2003, at Al (describing Ohio's budget crisis as having been called "the worst state budget 
crisis in 50 years"). 
50 Civil judgments presumably would not come directly out of the ODA's budget, but a 
substantial verdict would also presumably be noted in future evaluation of the agency in 
performance reviews and so on. The ODA's ride inspection program is funded in part by 
ride inspection fees ranging from $100 annually for "kiddie" rides to $950 annually for 
roller coasters, as well as annual $70 licensing fees. See OiO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 1711.11(C), 1711.53(E)(1) (West Supp. 2005). The ODA does not appear to make 
publicly accessible how much money is generated through these fees, but estimates based 
on numbers of rides suggests that the funding totals no more than several hundred thousand 
dollars. A smaller amount of money comes from fines imposed during inspections. In 
2003, fines totaled $39,600. Press Release, Ohio Dep't of Agric., Ohio Amusement Ride 
(continued) 
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as that of the inspectors in this case, even without the ODA's form 
revisions, surely plaintiffs' cases are stronger with the doctrine of 
negligence per se (and the opportunity to point to the inspectors' "no 
contest" pleas) than it would be without it. 
Additionally, the recruitment and retention of ride inspectors may well 
be impacted by high-profile prosecutions of or lawsuits against past 
inspectors; the manner in which the ODA responds to such suits may affect 
its ability to successfully hire and keep inspectors-again in the context of 
tight budgets. To provide some context, in 2003, the ODA had eight 
inspectors employed to monitor Ohio's 2,208 licensed amusement rides; in 
2004, that number dropped to five.5' One inspector quit, and two only 
inspected fair games while under prosecution for the Yoe death.52 
Lastly, regulators, including those at the ODA, do their jobs in a local 
and national environment in which elected officials and candidates urge 
that government be run "more like a business, 53 or more like "a rational 
profit-maximizing enterprise." 54  While what a "profit-maximizing 
enterprise" might mean in a regulatory agency context is hard to identify 
precisely,55 it almost certainly would mean avoiding exposure to 
substantial verdicts and evaluating decisions in economic terms, possibly 
Safety: Highlights of ODA's Consumer Safety Tips and Ride Inspection Program (Jan. 16, 
2004), http://www.ohioagriculture.gov/pubs/divs/anuscurr/amus-fs-ridesafety-O1 1604.stm. 
These fees are set by the legislature, and so the ODA cannot create the funding for more 
comprehensive inspections on its own. 
51 Associated Press, Carnival Ride Inspectors Try for Safety at State Fair,AKRON 
BEACON J., Aug. 2, 2004, at B8. 
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., Donnie Fetter, Legislators Tout Achievements of Latest Session, AUGUSTA 
CHRON., Apr. 20, 2005, at 6B, available at http:llchronicle.augusta.comstories/042005/ 
met_3942349.shtml (quoting a Georgia legislator as saying that Georgia government is 
being operated "more like a business"); Editorial, Taking Stock of the Reds, CINCINNATI 
POST, Mar. 12, 2005, at 10A, available at http://www.cincypost.com2005/03/12/ 
edita03l205.html (reporting that a county commissioner in Ohio urged that government 
operate like a business). A Westlaw search for "like a business" in the same sentence as 
"government" or "agency" in the last two years returned 514 documents in the ALLNEWS 
database. 
54 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,33 (1972). 
55 There is no direct analogue to profit in a regulatory context. Success for a regulatory 
agency could be found in a number of ways: a general comparison of performance to a 
mission statement, quantity of or success in enforcement actions, "customer" surveys, and 
so on. But if one focuses on operating "like a business," one would assume that the focus 
would be in spending funds efficiently and avoiding unnecessary or avoidable expenditures. 
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to the exclusion of considering the spirit of the agency's legislative 
mandate. 
In that context, it is no surprise that the rules were rewritten to 
decrease the future likelihood of liability. If a widget maker could 
eliminate all regulations relating to widget safety specifications, it would 
rationally do so, even if it had every intention to comply with those 
specifications.56 Such a manufacturer would no doubt be pleased to avoid 
the potential imposition of negligence per se if in the future it failed to 
comply with regulations, inadvertently or not. If it could expressly shift 
liability for widget failure to widget retailers or purchasers, it would 
naturally do so as well.57 
The differences between the public and private realms are critical here 
and may point to problems with the common practice of advocating that 
governmental entities act like businesses. When a private actor changes its 
behavior to avoid liability risks, those changes may be deemed to be a net 
negative-consider, for example, the arguments made urging the passage 
of the recently enacted federal law 58 granting immunity to gun 
manufacturers from products liability lawsuits, some of which are 
premised on the idea that there is a social good in having firearms 
available. 59  Notwithstanding this legislation, in the private business 
context, one would expect the market to demand some number of those 
products even if the price was higher due to the absence of the immunity, 
whether from an existing manufacturer or a new one.6° In the public realm, 
56 Basic concepts of negligence or products liability militate in favor of the 
manufacturer acting reasonably regardless of regulations, of course. But a manufacturer 
would like to have the flexibility to argue that any conduct is non-negligent and avoid being 
shown to have violated a regulatory requirement. 
57 I do not necessarily suggest that the ODA is "pleased" to have acted as it has, 
notwithstanding its public statements of comfort. See Press Release, Ohio Dep't of Agric., 
Agriculture Director Announces New Ride Safety Law (June 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.ohioagriculture.gov/rides/curr/news/ars-nr-newridelaw-063005.stm. Possibly, 
the ODA fully appreciates (and regrets?) the potential effects of its abandonment of 
electrical grounding evaluation and understands that those effects run counter to at least one 
interpretation of the legislative intent. But the incentives have combined to at least 
encourage if not mandate such a response. 
58 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 1-4, 119 Stat. 
2095, 2095-99 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7903 (Supp. 2006)).
59 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1529 (daily ed. Feb. 16,2005) (statement of Sen. Craig). 
60 Cf. Josh Goldstein, Insurance Brokers Surprised: Company Finds Coverage Still 
Availablefor IUDs, J. CoM., Nov. 25, 1987, at 9A (noting a new company's intention of 
reintroducing the IUD after the Dalkon Shield withdrawal). 
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no manufacturers are being "priced out of the market." Rather, in the 
public setting, the (regulatory) agency is concluding that it has been priced 
out of the market-the market being for safety itself. Unlike the private 
actors, in which another company can step up to provide the desired 
product, there is no competition for regulating rides or other activities that 
legislators have concluded need regulation. 
The ODA's decision here fits within that framework. Even if 
enhancing the electrical inspection process might be what a regulator 
would do if considering only the mandate to promulgate regulations that 
would achieve safety, the legislative mandate is not the only factor being 
considered by the ODA. Instead, the ODA arguably has acted precisely as 
one would predict it should if it is being run "like a business." It is 
avoiding economic risk, and, indeed, shifting that risk to other entities that 
lack the statutory authority to shirk it.
61 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS 
The ODA's situation is far from unique. The ever-more regulatory-
based government is premised on the delegation of broad powers and 
responsibilities to agencies, which then promulgate their own regulations 
to exercise the powers and achieve the responsibilities.62 When those 
agencies' motivations are considered in the abstract, such an approach is 
sound. But the power to set one's own rules can pervert the actor's 
incentives, especially in the context of budget pressures and focus to 
reduce or eliminate avoidable expenditures. When faced with those forces, 
it should come as no surprise that a government agency would do what it 
could to shift or avoid responsibility, even when the party to whom the 
61 Of course, the ride owners at least share final responsibility for the safety of their 
rides (at least from a tort law perspective), see supra note 31 and accompanying text, and so 
the ODA's form requiring the owners to acknowledge that responsibility is likely 
immaterial. What is more interesting is the ODA's implicit declaration that, with electrical 
safety being the owners' responsibility, it is necessarily not the ODA's. 
62 But see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 41, at 70. As was observed in the evolution 
of the NHTSA, a regulatory approach is only as effective as the combination of legislation, 
judicial decisionmaking, and the regulatory staff. See id. at 228. Providing broad safety 
mandates does not necessarily-or even often-result in improved safety. See id. at 70. 
Without a specific direction-and with the possibility of judicial challenges to new 
regulations-an agency may take the path of least resistance, especially when funding is 
limited. In NHTSA's case, that meant moving away from specific technical rulemaking 
and toward recalls, despite an absence of evidence that recalls, in fact, improved the safety 
of vehicles more than negligibly. See id.at 149. 
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responsibility is being shifted is not the best situated to perform the 
responsibility, or when that party has its own conflicts of interests. 
One might point to the Ohio legislative response-requiring 
certification of compliance with the National Electrical Code, among other 
things63-as solving the problem. While the legislation may avoid a future 
electrocution (and I applaud its passage), the Yoe situation is undoubtedly 
atypical in the level of publicity it received. If the ODA's decision to 
eliminate the grounding checks from its inspection forms had been made in 
the face of a less-public lawsuit or prosecution, a legislative response 
would be far less likely. 
Even more troubling, consider the rational regulator who is aware that 
the agency's employees are doing a bad job in one part of their duties and 
changes the regulation to preempt future litigation rather than fixing the 
employees' conduct. Suppose, for instance, that the ODA had realized 
when creating the forms that its inspectors knew little about electrical 
matters and lacked the necessary equipment to check things like 
grounding, and realized further that these failings were likely to result in a 
catastrophic outcome and litigation and therefore, never put the electrical 
items on the form in the first place. While Greyson Yoe's death would 
have gotten press and surely resulted in some litigation, it is far less clear 
that the ODA's actions would have been as central. The previously 
mentioned widget maker64 would rewrite (or eliminate) widget regulations 
before it violated them if it had the power to do so. So too, I contend, 
might a regulator reduce the burden on the agency to avoid future civil or 
criminal liability. These decisions are largely invisible, and so we cannot 
rely upon a legislative response to reverse them. 
Rather than a reactive legislative response, another legislative solution 
would be increased guidance to the agency in the first place. As noted 
earlier, the ODA-like many regulatory agencies-is given a very broad 
mandate.65 There are literally thousands of possible items involved with 
ride safety (as with building safety, car safety, or many other regulated 
industries), and so by practical necessity, not everything can or will be 
checked. The agencies must prioritize, and their prioritizations may run 
counter to the legislature's (unstated) preferences-here, by shifting the 
electrical safety obligation to the owner alone. This shift may in fact be 
quite rational; because electrical problems are so likely to cause severe 
injuries or death, ordinary economic incentives may make it most likely 
63Supra note 31. 
64 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
 
65See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
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that the ride owner will avoid those injuries while lower-cost injuries are 
best addressed by regulators. However, in a relatively under-capitalized 
industry where any significant judgment will shut down a company, these 
assumptions may not be well-founded.6 
The amusement ride industry (especially the portable ride industry) 
may be a particularly good example of a situation where economic 
incentives may not be enough to ensure that the industry participants act 
appropriately. Recall that the ride owner settled for his insurance limits of 
$1 million67 (which just met the requirement that ride operators provide the 
state with a certificate of insurance demonstrating coverage of $500,000 
per person and $1,000,000 per occurrence).6s One might expect that more 
than that amount would be pursued if assets were available to cover 
further. Additionally, much of the amusement industry (in particular the 
portable ride industry) carried a large amount of debt, with rides financed 
by a small number of lenders that specialize in such loans, at least 
sometimes affiliated with insurance carriers that specialize in covering 
carnivals.69 These lenders permit payments on the equipment loans only 
during the operating season, and their affiliated insurers provide relatively 
inexpensive no-deductible policies, suggesting that the carnival owners are 
"cash-strapped. '7 ° 
Accordingly, the legislature could anticipate a situation in which the 
regulatory agency lacked sufficient detail in its mission in advance and, in 
adopting the legislation that created jurisdiction, provide a somewhat more 
comprehensive mandate to the agency. If the legislature wanted to ensure 
that ride inspections included a determination of the wiring's compliance 
with the code, for example, it could be included in the first place. 
66 The ODA's decision may reflect what some might predict-the capture of the 
regulator by the major players in the industry (with substantially larger budgets and other 
resources). In this context, the major players, at least in terms of concentrated capital, are 
the fixed-site amusement park chains (Six Flags, Paramount, Disney, Universal, Cedar 
Point, etc.) and a small number of major carnival operators. Neither group is likely to be in 
the running for operating rides at a fair like the Lake County Fair. I have not seen any 
indication that amusement ride regulation (which is primarily a state activity), whether in 
Ohio or elsewhere, has in fact been captured by any segment of the industry, but neither can 
I exclude it as a possibility. 
67 Martin, supranote 5. 
68OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1711.54 (West 2003). 
69 See Shaun Sutner, Spin Control, SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Worcester, Mass.), Nov. 21, 
2004, at Al, available at http://worcestervoice.com/statetakes.exception-tosizzler_ 
comments.htm. 
70 id. 
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Another potential approach to such situations is to strengthen 
sovereign immunity. If the state faces no liability exposure for anything 
but the most irresponsible actions, the litigation implications of its 
decisions will be less of a factor. Here, for example, the ODA could have 
concluded that it was unable to do a perfect job of ensuring electrical 
safety, but that it could do a better job. With that conclusion, it could have 
provided additional training and equipment and felt confident that, even if 
safety was not ensured, at least the state faced no liability. Because Ohio 
potentially faced financial exposure here, however, the state is encouraged 
to consider litigation implications more than perhaps should be desired. Of 
course, in this situation, the ODA still faces the prospect of its employees 
being held criminally liable, but it would at least change some of the 
balance of incentives. 
CONCLUSION 
When criminal charges or civil suits are filed, we expect conduct to be 
changed. Most of the time, that expectation is achieved, at least partially. 
But we should be cautious in those assumptions when the defendants in 
those suits (or their employers) write their own rules and are urged to run 
themselves like businesses. When those incentives intersect, we may be 
disappointed to find that, indeed, government agencies will act like a 
business and write themselves out of future liability-making the harm that 
triggered the suits, whether it be the tragic death of a young boy or any 
other avoidable bad result, more rather than less likely. 
